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We present an empirical analysis of product differentiation using a rich new dynamic panel data 
set on film programming choice in a major U.S. metropolitan motion-pictures exhibition market.  
These data allow us to investigate the determinants of strategic product differentiation in a multi-
characteristics space.  We find evidence of stability in the degree of product differentiation over 
time, but also find that the degree of product differentiation between theatre pairs reflects a 
balance between strategic concerns and contractual constraints.  Similarity in one dimension is 
offset by differentiation in others.  Finally, we find that theatres under common ownership make 
more similar programming choices than theatres with different owners.   
 
 















We are grateful to the DeSantis Center for Motion Picture Industry Studies of Florida Atlantic University College of 
Business and Economics for providing a grant to fund this research and to Synergy Retail for compiling the data set 
used in this paper.  For valuable comments and suggestions, we thank Bart Addis, Thomas Downes, F. Andrew 
Hanssen, Sanjiv Jaggia, Zaur Rzakhanov, Alfonso Sanchez-Penalver, Richard Startz, Andrew Sweeting, Chih Ming 
Tan, Charles Weinberg, Jeffrey Zabel, and seminar participants at Suffolk University, the DeSantis Center Summit 
Workshop, and the International Industrial Organization Conference.  We are grateful to Vicky Huang, Anna 
Kumysh, and Vidisha Vachharajani for their careful research assistance and to Sorin Codreanu for his data-




   The seminal analysis by Hotelling (1929) on “Stability in Competition” has sparked a 
large and growing theoretical literature concerned with the following deceptively simple 
questions. Should we expect to find, as Hotelling claimed, that firms offering horizontally 
differentiated products choose product designs with minimum differentiation?  Or, should we 
expect to find, as d’Aspremont et al. (1979) claim in their critique of Hotelling, that these same 
firms seek maximal differentiation in their product designs in order to soften competition?   
The simple but frustrating answer to these theoretical questions is that “it depends”.   
Specifically, it depends upon the particular modeling assumptions that we make.  Borenstein and 
Netz (1999) aptly characterize the reason for the theoretical ambiguity.
1  Non-cooperative firms 
balance two forces when making their location, or more generally product-design choices: an 
“attraction” force that draws a firm closer to its rivals in order to steal business from them and a 
“repulsion” force that induces firms to separate in order to soften competition.  There is no a 
priori reason to believe that one of these forces always dominates the other.  
When theory is inconclusive, we must turn to empirical or experimental investigation to 
shed light on the interplay between these attraction and repulsion forces.  Unfortunately, very 
few such investigations are available.  Significant exceptions are Borenstein and Netz (1999) and 
Netz and Taylor (2002).  In both cases, however, the area of application is essentially spatial 
rather than one of product design.  Moreover, their areas of application are static, looking at 
location choices at a particular point in time.   
Our paper examines a particularly rich and dynamic type of product differentiation: the 
weekly film programming choices made by first-run movie theatres within a well-defined 




characteristics:  besides the location of the theatre there is also the number of different films 
being shown and the number of screenings of these films.  On this basis, movie theatre i is less 
differentiated from movie theatre j in a particular period the more movies, or screenings, they 
have in common in that period.   
Our analysis allows us to provide empirical evidence with respect to several important 
questions relating to product design and product re-design.   
First, do first-run movie theatres that are in more direct competition with each other on 
one dimension, such as location, adopt product designs – film programming selections – that are 
more, or less, similar?  Here we potentially have a theoretical prediction that is consistent with 
the “balacing” idea of Borenstein and Netz and that lends itself to empirical testing. Irmen and 
Thisse (1998) provide one of the few theoretical analyses of product design choices by firms that 
offer products with multiple characteristics.  They develop a model with quadratic utility loss 
that might be expected to generate maximal differentiation, but show that if there is a “dominant” 
characteristic, then firms will maximally differentiate on this characteristic and minimally 
differentiate on the others.   
Our empirical context is, of course, much more complex than that envisaged by Irmen 
and Thisse.  Complicating factors include: heterogeneous consumers; product characteristics that 
are not easily classified as being dominant or dominated; and the ability to change product 
design (movie mix) over time at relatively low cost.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that an empirical implication of the Irmen and Thisse analysis is that if movie theatres are 
                                                                                                                                                             




“close” to each other in one set of characteristics, whether by choice or as a result of an 
exogenous factor,
2 they will seek to differentiate themselves on other characteristics. 
Second, to what extent does ownership matter in product design?  A familiar and not 
surprising result from theory is that multi-product firms typically make different location or 
product design choices from single-product non-cooperative oligopolists.
3   I n  o u r  s p e c i f i c  
context, therefore, we should expect that a multi-outlet firm, such as a theatre chain, makes 
different design decisions from those of a single-outlet firm.  Full coordination of product-design 
choice by a particular multi-product firm is unlikely to be feasible, however, since this firm is in 
competition with other single- and multi-product firms.  
A novel feature of our data is that we track weekly movie selection for each first-run 
theatre in our sample for a period of 52 weeks.  This allows us to examine some of the dynamics 
of product differentiation.   In particular, the specific contractual system within which the movie 
theatres operate has a significant impact on the exhibitors’ choice of which movies to show in 
particular weeks.  The major studios typically release what they hope to be “blockbuster” movies 
close to important holidays and negotiate with the distributors and exhibitors to secure extensive 
coordinated release of these movies: the release of the final film in the “Lord of the Rings” 
trilogy is just one case in point.  As a result, we would expect to find greater similarity in movie 
selection nearer to major holidays.   
However, recall our hypothesis, derived from Irmen and Thisse, that when similarity is 
forced in one set of characteristics, we should expect to find differentiation in others.  In our 
specific dynamic context, we conjecture that there are important strategic elements to movie 
                                                 
2  We consider one such force, contractual relationships between movie producers and exhibitors, below. 




selection, with theatres exhibiting a desire to differentiate their offerings to at least some extent.  
It follows that similarity in programming choices close to major holidays in response to 
contractual pressures should be expected to decline in response to strategic considerations when 
we consider weeks further from such holidays.    
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.  First, movie theatres that are located 
geographically more closely to each other make film programming choices that are less similar.   
Second, similarity is high close to major holidays but then declines with “distance” from such 
holidays.  Third, “ownership matters” in the sense that theatre pairs under common ownership 
tend to be more similar in their film programming choices than do theatre pairs that have 
different owners.  The first two results are consistent with our theoretical expectations.  The third 
implies that the advantages of centralized contracting by theatres’ owners with movie 
distributors, and the importance of the center’s reading of the market, impact programming 
choice more than local strategic considerations. 
In the next section we develop our measures of similarity in product design.  Section III 
proposes a number of empirically testable determinants of similarity; Section IV describes the 
data, their sources and institutional background; Section V presents our empirical analysis; and 
Section VI provides concluding remarks. 
II Measuring  Product  Differentiation  in a Strategic Market Setting 
The dependent variable throughout our analysis is the degree of product similarity, 
measured weekly, between pairs of first-run movie theatres.  We consider two such measures.  
The first, SAijt,  motivated by Jaffe (1986), measures the angle between two vectors whose 




theatre j in a particular week t. This is an inverse measure of similarity in that the greater the 
angle, the lower is the similarity.  The second, SMijt, measures the percentage of movie matches 
between theatre i and theatre j, in a particular week t, relative to the total number of possible 
matches, with an appropriate normalization described below, and so provides a direct measure of 
similarity. 
A complication in measuring similarity in our specific context is that popular films may 
be shown on multiple screens in a given week.  As a result, our measure of similarity will differ 
depending upon whether we measure similarity in screenings or similarity in movies.  Our 
econometric analysis considers both screening and movie measures of similarity. 
For both the angular and the matching measures of similarity, we consider a well-defined 
geographic market, in our case the Boston metropolitan area.  For each week t we begin by 
counting the total number of films, Nt, playing in the first-run movie theatres across the entire 
market on a particular day: given our data sources, we chose the Friday of each week. We define 
the angular measure, SAijt, based on screenings, as follows.  The attributes vector Ait for theatre i 
in week t has length Nt, where the nth element anit corresponds to the nth film, with the films 
ordered alphabetically.  Suppose theatre i has five screens, each of which can show four films on 
a typical Friday and thus possesses a total “showings capacity” of 20 time slots.   Suppose further 
that in week t theatre i is showing four films, one of which is presented on two screens, out of a 
total of ten films that are being shown across the entire market that week. The elements of the 
attributes vector corresponding to the four films playing at theatre i are the percentages of screen 
capacity devoted to each film.  In the present example, three of the anit elements equal 0.20; the 




six cells of the attributes vector equal zero to reflect the absence of a current film from theatre 
i’s offerings in that week.  The attributes vector Ajt for theatre j is constructed analogously. 
The angular measure of the similarity between the two theatres’ film offerings based on 















SA arccos         (1) 
converted to degrees.  Thus if the two theatres have an identical set of films, with an identical 
distribution across screens, the angle between the vectors will be zero.  The angle between the 
vectors increases, and approaches 90 degrees, the more dissimilar or differentiated the theatres 
are relative to one another. 
An alternative angular measure we consider focuses on a simple comparison of films 
showing at theatres i and j.  Again, in week t we begin with a vector of length Nt as defined 
above.  If a film is playing at theatre i, the element in the vector corresponding to that film equals 
one; it equals zero otherwise.  If both theatre i and theatre j are showing the same set of films, 
even if the capacity distribution differs, the movie-count attributes vectors will be identical.  The 
angle between the vectors will be zero, implying “identical” products in a qualitative, but not 
proportionate, sense.  As the two theatres’ offerings diverge, this angular measure again 
approaches 90 degrees. 
A particular advantage of the angular measure of similarity, whether based on screenings 
or films, is that the “measure of proximity is purely directional i.e. it is not directly affected by 
the length of the (A) vectors.” (Jaffe, 1986, p. 986, fn 5)  In our specific context, the angular 




A limitation of the angular measure, however, is that it is sensitive to differences in the 
number of screens between theatres i and j: the greater is this difference the greater Aijt is likely 
to be.  In contrast to the matching measure (see below) no simple normalization for the impact of 
differences in numbers of screens suggests itself.  As a result, in the empirical implementation 
we include an independent variable that is designed to capture this effect. 
The second similarity measure we consider is derived from the percentage of matches 
between two theatres and thus quite naturally ranges between zero and one as two theatres move 
from perfectly dissimilar, or highly differentiated, to perfectly identical, or homogeneous.  Once 
again, we must take into account two complicating factors.  First, the number of screens at a 
particular theatre affects the characteristic (movie) mix that the theatre can offer.  Second, there 
is the possibility that a particular film might be shown on multiple screens in one theatre but not 
in another.   
This suggests the following approach for any pair of theatres i and j in each week t.  For 
each film playing at theatre i, determine if that film is also playing at theatre j in that week.  If so, 
and if the film is playing three times at theatre i and four times at theatre j, the number-of-
screenings matches for this film is three.  Add this to the other number-of-screenings matches for 
all other common films across both theatres to derive the total number of screenings in common, 
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where  h S  is the number of screenings that is possible at movie theatre h = i, j and β is a 




  An obvious limitation of Sijt is that, while it is distributed on the interval [0, 1], it is 
concatenated in this interval if  ij SS ≠ .  In other words, as with the angular measure the 
matching measure in (2) is affected by differences in the number of screens between theatre 
pairs.  In this case, however, a simple correction for this potential bias is available.  We 
normalize Sijt by the maximum degree of similarity  () ()
2




 to give the 
normalized matching similarity measure: 
















SM         ( 3 )  
The normalized matching similarity index (3) can be thought of as a count measure, 
reflecting the number of “successes” (or matches) the two products mutually possess, relative to 
the maximum potential for success (or matches).  This formulation of the similarity index 
suggests an underlying binomial process, which motivates our choice to confine our attention to 
β = 1/2.  Note also that, as with the angular measure, Nt does not directly affect this measure of 
similarity. 
III  Determinants of Product Similarity 
We now turn to the specific strategic and institutional factors that might be expected to 
influence the degree of similarity in film programming choice between two theatres.  In doing so, 
we distinguish between time-invariant effects that are likely to affect similarity in programming 
across weeks and time-variant effects that are likely to affect the dynamics of film programming 




Given the nature of our data and the available theory discussed in the introduction, there 
are three obvious time-invariant effects that we expect will influence the degree of similarity in 
movie selection for each theatre pair.  First, theatres that are located more closely to each other 
are likely to be in competition much more directly than those that are geographically separated.  
In order to test for this effect we construct DISTANCEij, the distance in miles between theatre i 
and theatre j, derived from GPS data for each theatre.  The Irmen and Thisse analysis discussed 
above leads us to expect that theatres more closely located to each other in one characteristic, in 
this case geographic location, will seek to differentiate themselves in other characteristics (movie 
offerings) in order to soften competition for customers.  Thus we expect the angular similarity 
index to decrease, and the proportionate similarity index to increase, with DISTANCEij.
4   
Second, we expect to find that “ownership matters” in film programming choice, but in 
this case precisely how is not clear a priori.  To capture the different incentives that might arise 
when two theatres are owned by the same company, we create the dummy variable 
SAMEOWNERij, which equals one if theatre i and theatre j are owned by the same company, and 
zero otherwise.  If companies negotiate better contracting terms with distributors when movies 
are acquired in bulk, or if programming decisions are centralized and affected by the “center’s” 
reading of the market, we would expect SAMEOWNERij to increase programming similarity. By 
contrast, if programming decisions are centralized and dominated by the desire to avoid direct 
competition between theatres under common ownership we would expect SAMEOWNERij to 
decrease similarity.  Finally, if individual theatres behave autonomously, with inter-theatre 
                                                 
4 A movie distributor might decide that only one theatre, within close proximity to another, is allowed to show a 
particular film based on a clearance zone.   While data are not available on the specific clearance terms of the films 





competitive forces dominating programming choice, and with few economies from large-scale 
distribution contracts, then SAMEOWNERij should have little or no effect. 
Third, we expect that programming choice will be affected at least in part by 
demographics, to the extent that movie-going choices differ by the precise characteristics of the 
movie-going population “close to,” and thus within, the natural catchment area of a particular 
movie theatre.  As a result, we test for the importance of differences in a number of demographic 
variables, including age, income, population, and households, each measured within three-, five-, 
and ten-mile radii of each of the theatres in a given ij pair. 
We noted in the introduction that the contractual context in which movie theatres operate 
is likely to affect film programming choice.  In particular, since our focus is on first-run theatres 
in a major metropolitan area, we would expect similarity in programming choice to be greatest in 
the vicinity of major holidays when many of the theatre owners are contractually committed to 
allocate multiple screens to “holiday” films, whose release dates are announced several months 
in advance.   
One approach to measuring this effect would be to introduce a dummy variable, 
dependent upon whether or not a particular week is “close to” a holiday.  We conjecture, 
however, that similarity forced by contractual considerations is counteracted by the desire to 
differentiate deriving from strategic considerations.  If this is the case, then we should expect to 
find that similarity decreases more smoothly with “distance” from major holidays.  We test for 
this effect by HOLIDAYDISTANCEt, defined as the number of weeks the current week is away 
from the nearest holiday.  If the current week is a holiday week, HOLIDAYDISTANCEt equals 




holidays is divided in half.  As a result, HOLIDAYDISTANCEt increases with the number of 
weeks away from the first holiday until it reaches the half-way point between the two holidays, 
then declines incrementally until it reaches zero again at the next holiday.  We use Memorial 
Day, the Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, and Christmas as the holidays in our sample, reflecting 
the historical importance of these major holidays for revenue generation for motion-pictures 
exhibitors.  Our general expectation is that theatres will offer more similar programming choices 
closer to holidays. 
We noted in the previous section that the angular measure SAijt is likely to be positively 
biased if theatres i and j have different numbers of screens.   Differences in screens between 
theatre pairs reflect differences in capacity and so should result in differences in revenues.  As a 
result, we introduce the variable %REVDIFFijt-1, the magnitude of the difference in total weekly 
revenue between the two theatres during the previous week, divided by the average weekly 
revenue generated by the two theatres during the previous week.
5  We anticipate that there will 
be a positive relationship between differences in market share and revenue generation and our 
angular measure of similarity SAijt.  By contrast, since the angular measure is normalized for 
screens, %REVDIFFijt-1 should have no significant impact on SMijt.   
Finally, we expect to observe some degree of inertia in programming choice:  if two 
theatres offer similar film programming choices this week they are likely to have been similar 
last week; if they were similar last week they will have been similar the week before, and so on.  
As with our holiday measure, however, this inertia will be offset by strategic considerations that 
lead theatres to try to differentiate themselves.  The stronger are the strategic considerations the 
                                                 
5  An alternative approach is to introduce a time-invariant measure such as the absolute difference in the number of 




shorter will be the period over which inertia in programming is likely to be important.  This 
leads us to include lagged values of the dependent variable in the analysis. 
IV Film-Programming  Data  and Institutional Background 
The implementation of our econometric analysis is based upon data drawn from the first-
run motion-pictures exhibition market in the Boston metropolitan area.  The market contains 13 
theatres in and around Boston: see Figure 1 for their locations.  For each theatre, for each week 
from June 30, 2000 through the week of June 22, 2001, we have information from Nielsen EDI 
on which films were playing, and on the revenues generated at each theatre by each film for that 
week.  We supplemented these data by recording screening times on the Friday of each week, for 
each film, for each theatre in our data set. Screening-time information was determined by 
reviewing Boston Globe movie advertisements on microfilm.
6  This screening information is the 
basis for constructing the screenings-count similarity indexes.  
(Figure 1 near here)  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. The total number of observations for each 
of the similarity indexes is 4,056, generated for 78 ij pairs over the 52 weeks we study. As we 
noted above, the angular similarity index is restricted to the interval [0, 90] while the matching 
index is restricted to the interval [0, 1]. The mean of the angular index is 39.74 and of the 
matching index is 0.80.  This indicates that there is some underlying degree of similarity in film 
programming choice across the theatre pairs in our sample.  However, there is also considerable 
                                                 
6 One first-run theatre in Quincy advertised in the Boston Globe from June 30, 2000 through September 28, 2000, 
but did not advertise for the remainder of the time period.  We have excluded the Quincy theatre from our main 
empirical analysis under the assumption that it belongs to a market south of Boston and thus it is not reasonable to 
treat it as being in competition with the theatres that were closer to Boston and that advertised in the same medium.  
However, when we include Quincy in our analysis and limit our period of study to June 30
th through September 28
th, 
we obtain results similar to our main findings.  These findings are documented in detail in Section V along with our 




variability in film programming choice, as indicated by the ranges of the angular and matching 
indexes.  Figure 2, which illustrates the weekly pattern in the angular similarity measure for one 
theatre relative to the others in the sample,
7 further suggests that while there are significant 
differences in the degree of similarity across theatre pairs, there is some consistency in the 
variation in the similarity measure over time, perhaps as a result of the seasonal contractual 
issues noted above.   
(Table 1 near here) 
(Figure 2 near here) 
DISTANCE between two ij pairs varies from a minimum of little over a mile, the distance 
between Copley Place and Fenway 13, both in Boston, and a maximum of roughly 54 miles, the 
distance between Liberty Tree Mall, Danvers and Showcase Cinemas, Randolph.  The mean 
distance between theatre pairs is roughly 19 miles.  Figure 1 suggests, and Table 1 confirms, that 
there is no significant difference in the average distance between theatres in our sample that are 
under the same ownership and those that are owned by different chains. 
SAMEOWNER has a mean of 0.28 indicating that roughly twenty-eight percent of the ij 
pairs are theatre pairs owned by the same parent company. Three companies owned the theatres 
comprising the first-run Boston market during our period of study:  National Amusements 
Corporation; General Cinema (G.C.) Corporation; and Loews Cineplex Entertainment 
Corporation.
8  Of these three companies, National Amusements held the dominant market 
                                                 
7  The theatre we chose is Assembly. 
8  Theatres owned by National Amusements include:  Cleveland Circle Cinemas (Brookline); Quincy Cinemas; 
Showcase Cinemas of Dedham; Showcase Cinemas of Randolph; Showcase Cinemas of Revere; and Showcase 
Cinemas of Woburn.  Theatres owned by General Cinema include:  Braintree 10; Burlington 10; Chestnut Hill 
Cinema 5; and Fenway 13 (Boston).  Theatres owned by Loews Cineplex Entertainment include:  Assembly Square 
(Somerville); Copley Place (Boston); Fresh Pond 10 (Cambridge); and Liberty Tree Mall (Danvers).  Note that this 




position, owning six theatres, spread across the radial market around Boston, with significant 
coverage on or near the I-95 loop enclosing the Boston metropolitan area.  General Cinema 
Corporation owned four theatres, distributed in a similar pattern to National Amusements’ 
capacity, but on a smaller scale, and with proportionately greater market concentration closer to 
Boston.
9  Loews owned four theatres, whose locations were concentrated in the 
Boston/Cambridge area, with one theatre located further north on the I-95 loop.
10   
HOLIDAYDISTANCE has a mean of 4 and a maximum of 10, attained in week 11 and in 
weeks 36 and 37 in our sample.  These are the weeks that lie midway between the Fourth of July 
and Thanksgiving, and between Christmas and Memorial Day, respectively.   
Figure 3 compares HOLIDAYDISTANCE to the mean similarity indexes for each week 
for the total sample, for theatre pairs under the same ownership, and for theatre pairs under 
different ownership.  A number of implications follow from this figure, each of which is tested 
formally in our econometric analysis.  It does, indeed seem to be the case that there is an inverse 
relationship between similarity in film programming choice and “distance” from major holidays 
(recall that the angular index is an inverse measure of similarity).  Further, the dynamics of film 
programming choice seem quite similar whether the theatres pairs are under the same or different 
ownership.  However, ownership does indeed appear to be important, with theatre pairs under 
common ownership typically offering more similar film programming choices than those under 
different ownership.    
                                                 
9 General Cinema Corporation filed for Chapter 11 reorganization on October 11, 2000; AMC Entertainment won 
approval to acquire General Cinema’s assets in March 2002.  The GCC theatres in the Boston market operated 
continuously throughout our period of study, and the quality and features of the theatres were similar to competing 
first-run theatres in the Boston market.  See “Court Approves GC Cos. Sale to AMC,” Boston Business Journal, 




The variable %REVENUE DIFF has a mean of .65 and ranges between a minimum of 
nearly zero to 1.70 for the total sample.  Thus the percentage difference in the previous week’s 
revenue can range from virtually no difference to almost 170 percent difference.  The average 
percentage difference is similar for theatre pairs under the same ownership (.69) as for theatre 
pairs under different ownership (.63). 
The demographic variables, which measure percentage differences in demographic values 
within five-mile radii of theatre i compared the values within a five-mile radius of theatre j, 
cover age, income, population, and number of households.  The %AGE DIFF and %INCOME 
DIFF measure percentage differences in average age and average income, respectively.  The 
means of %AGE DIFF, %INCOME DIFF, %POPULATION DIFF, and %HOUSEHOLD DIFF  
are 0.04, 0.17, 0.73, and 0.76, respectively.  We focus on differences in age distribution and 
income in the econometric analysis. 
During the time period of our study, no first-run theatres in this market opened or closed.  
Thus we can treat the spatial structure of the market as essentially constant throughout the period 
of study.  Further, when we examine the theatre i and theatre j pairs using panel-data techniques, 
we work with a balanced data set.   
V  Econometric Model and Results 
Because a number of our important explanatory variables are time-invariant (DISTANCE, 
SAMEOWNER, and the demographic characteristics), we adopt pooled ordinary least-squares as 
                                                                                                                                                             
10Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corporation resulted from the merger of Sony/Loews Theatres and Cineplex 
Odeon Corporation in May 1998.  We treat theatres operating under either the name of Sony or Loews as being 




our main estimation method.
11  We estimate equations of the following general form, where SIijt 
represents the similarity index of interest, either angular (SAijt) or matching (SMijt): 
  SIijt = α + xijtβ1 + νij β2+ εijt        ( 4 )  
Note that in this formulation, each theatre pair is treated as the ijth cross-sectional group.   
Equation 4 states that the similarity index for a given theatre pair, in a given week, will 
be a function of strategic factors, some of which vary with time, xijt, and some of which are time-
invariant,  νij, within this theatre-pair relationship. εijt is the usual disturbance term. One 
complication arises due to the fact that our dependent variable is truncated either on the interval 
[0, 90] or [0, 1]. This means that we may obtain predicted values outside the range of actual 
possible values. One way of addressing this limitation is to transform the dependent variable 
using, for example, a log-odds ratio. One drawback of such a transformation is that the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients then becomes more complicated. Thus our preferred 
strategy is to report coefficients estimated using the truncated variables.
12 
To summarize, we estimate the following reduced-form equation using pooled ordinary 
least squares: 
SIijt= α + β1SAMEOWNERij + β2DISTANCEij + β3HOLIDAYDISTt+ β4%REVDIFFij,t-1 + 
β5%AGEDIFFij  +  β6SIij,t-1  +  β7SIij,t-2  +  εijt     ( 5 )   
                                                 
11 Within (ij pair) estimates reported in the appendix show that the estimated coefficients on the time-varying 
variables correspond closely to the estimates obtained using pooled OLS. 
12 The matching index, SMijt, is the more appropriate candidate for a log-odds transformation, since it ranges from 
zero to 1; with appropriate adjustments for values of zero and one, the problem of out-of-range predictions is 
addressed.  The qualitative results for the SMijt estimations are unaffected when the estimation is repeated using a 




where the dependent variable represents either the angular measure of similarity or the 
normalized matching measure.
13  We extend this regression by systematically replacing 
%AGEDIFF with the three other demographic variables discussed previously.  
The estimation results for the angular showtimes similarity index are presented in Table 
2, Regression I.
14 Using a modified Breusch-Godfrey test (Greene p. 270), we test for 
autocorrelation of order one (AR1) and do not find evidence of AR1.  We include the 
demographic variable %AGEDIFF i n  R e g r e s s i o n  I ;  w e  r e p l ace this demographic with 
%INCOMEDIFF in Regression II.   
(Table 2 near here) 
The results in Table 2 indicate that as the distance between two theatres decreases, the 
angle between the attributes vectors increases:  theatres’ offerings become more differentiated 
the more geographically proximate they are.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
similarity in one characteristic, in this case location, will lead theatres to differentiate themselves 
in other characteristics, film programming, in order to soften competition between them.   
It is also clear that ownership does, indeed, matter, although we noted above that the 
expected sign of SAMEOWN is ambiguous.  Our results show that when the same company owns 
two theatres, the angle between their attributes vectors declines.  Thus, all else equal, two 
theatres owned by the same company are more similar in their film offerings than are two 
                                                 
13 Given our interest in the impact of both time-varying and time-invariant explanatory variables, we considered 
adopting a random-effects estimation approach.  One drawback to this approach is that including lagged values of 
the dependent variable would introduce correlation with the other regressors.  We repeated our empirical analysis, 
removing lagged-dependent values, using a random-effects specification, verifying its appropriateness with a 
Hausman specification test.  The qualitative results under this specification are consistent with those presented in 
Table 2.   
14 When the estimation is repeated including the Quincy theatre, and limited to the period June 30,2000-September 




theatres owned by separate companies.  This result suggests that the economies from studio-
exhibitor contracts, and centralized control of movie program choice, are more important than 
coordination of programming choices to mitigate business stealing from a chain’s own theatres.  
It should further be noted, however, that this result is specific to our particular context.  Sweeting 
(2003) in a study of music variety in the radio industry finds the opposite effect: radio stations 
under common ownership tend to be more differentiated in their music programming choices. 
It might be suggested that there is some relationship between DISTANCE and 
SAMEOWN.  There are, however, two reasons for rejecting this.  First, as we noted in the 
previous section, there is no significant difference in the average distance between theatres in our 
sample that are under the same ownership and those that are owned by different chains.  Second, 
including the interaction term DISTANCE*SAMEOWN leaves the estimates largely unchanged, 
while the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant.
15  
As expected, program selection is more similar across theatres the nearer we are to major 
holidays, consistent with our hypothesized interaction between contractual and strategic 
determinants of program choices.  Contractual considerations are driven by binding 
commitments on the part of exhibitors to exhibit “holiday” films on high-profile, longstanding 
release dates.  There is an industry pattern of wide release of holiday films, expected to appeal to 
a broad audience, followed by more limited releases of a larger number of films expected to 
succeed in niche markets. The former effect “forces” similarity close to holidays while the latter 
provides theatres more flexibility to capitalize strategically on theatre-specific strengths.  
                                                                                                                                                             
found in Table 2, Regression I.  SAMEOWN becomes insignificant and %REVDIFF becomes significant, with p-
values of 0.161 and 0.021, respectively. 
15 Note also that including interaction terms for DISTANCE and SAMEOWNER with HOLIDAYDISTANCE leads to 




Larger percentage differences in last period’s revenue are, as expected, associated with 
an increase in the angle between the attributes vectors of two theatres, reflecting the positive bias 
in SAijt when the theatres have different screen capacities.
16  
  Differences in demographic characteristics of neighboring populations also have a 
significant influence on the degree of differentiation in programming choice. The greater the 
difference in the mean income of residents within a five mile radius of each theatre in a theatre 
pair the more similar is that pair’s programming choice.
17  This result would appear at first to be 
counter-intuitive.  If differences in income are associated with differences in tastes, then we 
might expect that differences in income would be associated with more product differentiation:  
theatres located close to higher-income individuals would show a different set of films from 
theatres located close to low-income individuals.  On the other hand, suppose that differences in 
income are associated not with differences in tastes but with a separation in the natural markets 
for a pair of theatres: high-income individuals do not go to theatres in low-income markets and 
vice versa.   Then theatres located in markets differentiated by income will not have strong 
strategic reasons to differentiate their program choices.    
This latter interpretation is consistent with our finding that when we use percentage 
differences in average age at a five-mile radius, we find a significant, positive coefficient.
18  In 
other words, larger differences in the age of the surrounding population lead to more 
differentiated programming.  The industry has long believed that the choice of which movie to 
                                                 
16 There was no change to our qualitative results when we repeated this analysis using the time-invariant variable 
DIFFSCRig -  the absolute value of the difference in screens between theatre i and j. 
17 The income effect is insignificant at the three-mile radial measure but significant at a ten-mile radius. 
18 The age effect is insignificant at the three-mile and ten-mile radial measures.  When %POPDIFF or 
%HOUSEHOLDDIFF replaces the age demographic, neither is significant for either three- or five-mile radii.  Both 




see is significantly affected by the age of the movie-goer.  If this is the case, then markets with 
very different age groups are likely to be serving consumers with different tastes, weakening the 
strategic interaction between these markets and leaving film programming choice to be 
determined more by taste than strategic considerations.
19  
Finally, we find that there is, indeed, a degree of inertia in the relative film programming 
choices between two theatres.  If the theatres were similar in their programming choices last 
week, they will be similar this week.  
When we replace the angular showtimes similarity index with the angular movie-count 
index, we obtain results that are substantively similar to the signs, magnitudes of the coefficients, 
and significance levels of the results in Table 2.  Table 3 presents these results.  The modified 
Breusch-Godfrey test indicates the presence of AR1, thus we estimate (5) using feasible 
generalized least squares (FGLS) and present the AR1-corrected results.
20 
(Table 3 near here) 
The estimation results of Equation 5 using the normalized matching similarity index, with 
the appropriate AR1 corrections, are presented in Table 4.  Note that the interpretation of the 
coefficients in Table 4 is the opposite of the interpretation for the angular measure:  the angular 
measure increases with differentiation; the matching measure increases with similarity.   
(Table 4 near here) 
                                                 
19  See Davis (2001) for a formal model of consumer taste parameters in the motion picture exhibition market. 
20 The demographic patterns mirror those found in Table 2; neither the population nor the household measure is 
significant at three- or five-mile radii; both measures are marginally significant at the 10-mile radius (p-values 0.123 
and 0.104, respectively).  For the partial-year subsample including the Quincy theatre, all coefficients retain the 
signs in Table 3 and all variables remain significant, with the exception of %AGEDIFF, now marginally significant 




The results for this alternative similarity measure are qualitatively consistent with those 
for the angular similarity index.  Similarity between theatre pairs decreases when theatres are 
geographically proximate, increases when theatres are under common ownership and decreases 
the further we are from major holidays. As anticipated, %REVENUE DIFFERENCEij,t-1 is no 
longer significant, reflecting our normalization of the matching measure to correct for any bias 
associated by differences in screen capacities across theatre pairs..  
VI  Conclusion  
Hotelling’s claim that non-cooperative oligopolists will offer consumers product variants 
characterized by an “excessive sameness” has given rise to considerable debate.  The outcome 
has been a large and growing theoretical literature with little consistency in its predictions and so 
with few clear empirically testable propositions.  This is, in fact, not at all surprising.  As 
Borenstein and Netz (1999) point out, firms competing in a simple, one-dimensional 
characteristics space seek to balance competing forces: an attraction force as they try to steal 
each others markets and a repulsion force as they seek to soften competition.  There is no reason 
to believe a priori that either of these forces will dominate the other.  
Extending the analysis to a multi-characteristics space, as in Irmen and Thisse (1998), 
while presenting formidable technical challenges, does generate a cleaner testable proposition.  
Simply put, we should expect to find that when firms either choose or are constrained to be more 
similar in some characteristics they will seek to differentiate themselves on others.        
Our analysis has tested and provides strong support for this proposition using a 
particularly rich and dynamic data set from the motion-pictures exhibition market. As might be 




However, we also find strong evidence that there are important strategic determinants of 
product differentiation.  In particular, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the degree of product differentiation between theatre pairs reflects a complex balance between 
strategic concerns and contractual constraints.  Theatre pairs located more closely in geographic 
space make less similar programming choices.  Although contractual constraints may force 
similarity in programming near major holidays, strategic considerations lead to a reduction in 
similarity as we move away from such holidays.  Both of these results suggest that when firms’ 
product design choices are similar in one dimension, strengthening the business stealing effect 
that underlies the attraction force, the repulsion force leads them to seek to differentiate in other 
dimensions. 
Theory is less clear regarding the impact of ownership on product differentiation.  Our 
analysis has found evidence that theatre pairs under common ownership tend to make more 
similar programming choices.  This may well reflect the organizational architecture in this 
industry, where local managers’ autonomy to make programming choices is constrained by the 
movie-studio/theatre-chain relationship.  It suggests more generally that the impact of ownership 
on strategic product differentiation is institution specific. 
Several extensions of this work suggest themselves.  Both the angular and matching 
indexes provide robust, dimensionless measures of the degree of differentiation between pairs of 
products that can be easily modified to measure product-attribute differences in a wide range of 
industries.  This offers the potential for broader empirical investigation of the determinants of 
product differentiation and product similarity.  Looking specifically at the movie exhibition 




pairs.  Similarity in turn is determined by specific decisions at the individual theatre level 
regarding which films should be retained and which dropped from week to week.  In our future 
work we hope to apply hazard function and duration model techniques to analyze these more 




Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for First-Run Theatres in Boston Metropolitan Market 
June 30, 2000-Jun 22, 2001 
  
All Theatre Pairs 
 
Theatre Pairs with Same  
Owners Only 
 
Theatre Pairs with Different  
Owners Only 

























































0.28 0.45 0.00  1.00  1.00 0.00 1.00  1.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
DISTANCE 
 
18.74 11.63  1.24 54.04  19.99 11.04  2.58 44.93  18.25 11.82  1.24 54.04 
HOLIDAY DISTt 
 
4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00  4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00  4.33 3.09 0.00  10.00 
%REVENUE DIFFt-1 
 
0.65 0.40  0.0004  1.6963 0.69 0.38  0.0004  1.6672 0.63 0.41  0.0013  1.6963 
%AGE DIFF 
 
0.04 0.03  0.0008  0.0934 0.04 0.02  0.0008  0.0839 0.04 0.03  0.0020  0.0934 
%INCOME DIFF 
 
0.17 0.13  0.0003  0.5432 0.17 0.14  0.0014  0.4193 0.17 0.13  0.0003  0.5432 
%POPULATION DIFF 
 
0.73 0.46  0.0054  1.4574 0.77 0.44  0.0054  1.4180 0.72 0.47  0.0229  1.4574 
%HOUSEHOLD  DIFF  0.76 0.48  0.0104  1.5002 0.80 0.46  0.0407  1.4486 0.74 0.49  0.0104  1.5002 
Similarity indices are based on showtime counts; SMt is scaled by 100 for interpretation as percentage match. 
Demographic difference variables are based on comparisons of values within a five-mile radius of each theatre, for each ij pair, from 2001 Census estimates.   
Total number of observations is 4,056; for lagged variables total number of observations is 3, 978. Table 2.  Estimation of Angular Show-Count Similarity Index  


































%INCOME DIFFERENCE    -1.747 
(0.831)** 
 









    
Sample Size  3900  3900 
Overall R
2  0.8227 0.8225 
p-Value for AR1 Test  0.207  0.133 
Estimation by pooled OLS with robust standard errors. 
Dependent variable is SAt, the angle between theatre-pair attributes vectors, using showtime counts.   
Percentage age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income within a five-
mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 
Data ranges over 50 of the 52 weeks due to twice-lagged dependent variable. 






Table 3.  Estimation of Angular Movie-Count Similarity Index  


































%INCOME DIFFERENCE    -1.744 
(0.839)** 
 









    
Sample Size  3900  3900 
Wald Test  14067.47  14973.82 
Estimation by FGLS for panel data with AR1 and panel-heteroskedacticity corrections. 
Dependent variable is SAt, the angle between theatre-pair attributes vectors, using movie counts.   
Percentage age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income within a five-
mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 
Data ranges over 50 of the 52 weeks due to twice-lagged dependent variable. 






Table 4.  Estimation of Normalized Matching Show-Count Similarity Index  


































%INCOME DIFFERENCE    2.420 
(0.753)*** 
 









    
Sample Size  3900  3900 
Wald Test  13541.22  14029.32 
Estimation by FGLS for panel data with AR1 and panel-heteroskedacticity corrections. 
Dependent variable is SMt, the normalized matching index, using showtime counts, scaled by 100 for interpretation 
as percentage match .   
Percentage age and income differences are based on comparisons of average age and average income within a five-
mile radius of each theatre, for each ij theatre pair, from 2001 Census estimates. 
Data ranges over 50 of the 52 weeks due to twice-lagged dependent variable. 
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; standard errors reported in parentheses. 
 






































































































All Observations Same Owner Only Different Owner Only Holiday Distance  












































All Observations Same Owner Only  Different Owner Only Holiday Distance  
 







  In the event that our time-invariant variables do not capture all of the time-invariant 
heterogeneity, the pooled OLS estimates will be inconsistent. Therefore, we report below results 
of the within estimator that controls for all possible time-invariant effects. Because our model 
includes lagged dependent variables, we sweep away the fixed effects using a forward-mean 
differencing transformation, which removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of all future 
observations available for each ij pair. This transformation is otherwise known as “orthogonal 
deviations” or the Helmert transformation and is described in Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Bond and Meghir (1994). Unlike first-differencing, the forward-mean differencing preserves the 
error structure and therefore does not require any correction for serial correlation in the error 
terms. We then estimate the model using instrumental variables. Our instruments are lags (t-1) of 
the right hand side variables. To test the validity of our instruments, we report both a Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions, and direct tests of serial correlation in the residuals. Our tests of 
serial correlation are based on a Gauss-Newton regression and described in Davidson and 





                                                                 Appendix Table 1: Within Estimates  
 





Count Similarity Index 
Holiday Distancet  0.525 0.249 -0.300 
 (4.40)**  (1.95)*  (3.75)** 
%REVENUE DIFFERENCE(t-1)  18.513 27.934 -7.916 
  (2.27)* (1.97)* (0.87) 
SA(t-1)  0.505 0.929 0.842 
 (1.99)*  (2.74)**  (4.94)** 
SA(t-2)  -0.113 -0.305 -0.129 
 (0.65)  (1.35)  (0.96) 
Constant  1.152 0.815 -0.036 
 (4.02)**  (2.15)*  (0.16) 
Observations  3588 3588 3588 
                                                                                              Diagnostic Tests (p-values) 
Sargan  Test 0.175 0.494 0.314 
First-Order Serial Correlation  0.122 
 
0.749 0.559 
Second-Order Serial Correlation  0.612 
 
0.450 0.701 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimates 
obtained using a Helmert transformation and the generalized method of moments. Instruments used are the appropriate lags of 
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